The relatively new construct of emotional intelligence (EI) has been a focus of much research activity and general interest. This can be attributed to the appeal of examining the ways in which people differ in their emotion-related capabilities, particularly if such differences can be linked to important real-world criteria. Because of the diversity of EI-related outcomes, EI research is carried out in a wide range of psychology sub-disciplines beyond the area of individual differences. Findings in one area where EI has been identified as potentially salient, psychological well-being, are discussed in more detail below. Other active areas within EI research include the study of associations with job performance and leadership (e.g. Barbuto & Burbach, 2006; Carmelli & Josman, 2006; van Rooy & Viswesvaran, 2004) , academic success (e.g. Parker, Summerfeldt, Hogan, & Majeski, 2004) , social competence (e.g. Mavroveli, Petrides, Rieffe, & Bakker, 2007) and quality of relationships (e.g. Smith, Heaven, & Ciarrochi, 2008; Zeidner & Kaluda, 2008) .
Measurement of EI and evidence for validity
As EI research has developed it has diverged into two subfields, trait and ability EI (Petrides & Furnham, 2003; Petrides, Furnham, & Mavroveli, 2007) . The ability EI perspective takes as a starting point the presumption (discussed in more detail in the next section) that EI is a cognitive ability which is not measured by standard intelligence tests and which relates to reasoning and problem solving in the emotional domain. By contrast, the trait EI perspective regards EI as being located within the personality domain 1 .
There is now a well-established consensus that the two versions of EI are distinct and do not measure the same construct. The measurement methods for the two forms of EI differ. Ability EI tests resemble standard intelligence tests, whilst trait EI is measured via self-report; correlations between trait and ability EI test scores have consistently been found to be low. Example correlations found in recent studies are .04 (Bastian, Burns, & Nettelbeck, 2005) , .21, .18 (Bracket & Mayer, 2003) , .34 (O'Connor & Little, 2003) . In addition, the correlation patterns with intelligence and personality differ for trait and ability EI. Trait measures show medium to large correlations with the major five-factor model personality dimensions, and are generally uncorrelated with intelligence. Ability measures show the reverse pattern of positive correlations with intelligence test scores and low correlations with personality.
Correlations between the MSCEIT and measures of general ability have been reported in recent studies to be in the range .25 to.32 (Bastian et al., 2005; O'Connor & Little, 20003; Zeidner, Shani-Zinovich, Matthews, & Roberts, 2005) , with the corresponding range for trait EI being -.21 to .15. A meta-analysis covering the earlier ability EI MEIS test and trait EI reported a true score correlation of .33 for ability EI and .09 for trait EI (van Rooy & Viswesvaran, 2004) . There is also evidence for stronger associations of ability EI with crystallised than with fluid ability (e.g. MacCann, Roberts, Matthews, & Zeidner, 2004; Mayer, Caruso, & Salovey, 1999; Roberts, Zeidner, & Matthews, 2001) . Typical correlations of EI measures with personality traits are exemplified by the results reported for the Big Five by Austin, Farrelly, Black, and Moore (2007) . These were, for trait EI, Neuroticism -.56, Extraversion .43, Openness .12, Agreeableness .37, Conscientiousness .24, and for the .03, .11, 21, . Both these correlational findings and the measurement method for trait EI, which involves selfreports of typical performance rather than problem-solving (maximal) performance, indicate that trait EI tests do not measure a form of intelligence, and any claim that they do so is mistaken. The viewpoint that trait EI is appropriately placed in the personality domain is supported by a recent factor-analytic study (Petrides, Pita, & Kokkinaki, 2007) which showed trait EI emerging as a separate lower-order factor within established personality models.
There is evidence for the criterion validity of both trait and ability EI measures. Taking the area of health and well-being as an example, the broad theoretical prediction is that EI should be positively associated with measures of psychological health such a life satisfaction and negatively associated with indicators of psychological distress such as stress and depression. The reason for expecting such associations is that intrapersonal components of EI (such as the ability to perceive one's own emotions and regulate mood) should assist with stress management and adaptive coping, with interpersonal components of EI also being expected to play a role in well-being by enabling high EI individuals to form better social support networks. Both trait and ability EI have been found to correlate as expected with psychological well-being measures, for example positively with life satisfaction and negatively with anxiety, depression and loneliness (e.g. Bastian et al., 2005; Ciarrochi, Chan, & Caputi, 2000; Saklofske, Austin, & Minski, 2003) , whilst associations between EI and adaptive coping have also been found (Bastian et al., 2005; Saklofske, Austin, Galloway, & Davidson, 2007) . There is evidence for the incremental validity of EI in accounting for additional variance in health and wellbeing and other criteria when intelligence and personality are controlled for, but the additional percentage variance accounted for is generally 5% or less (Zeidner, Roberts, & Matthews, 2008) .
Issues in ability EI research
The main focus of this paper is ability EI. The claim that this construct represents a new form of intelligence not currently assessed by standard intelligence test batteries is a controversial and disputed one (e.g. . The associations found between ability EI and intelligence mentioned above can be interpreted as evidence for EI as a new form of intelligence which fits into the positive manifold of cognitive abilities (Carroll, 1993) , although a more detailed examination of the findings to date shows mixed results, with not all EI components being consistently associated with intelligence test scores, and with the most robust findings relating only to tests of emotional understanding (e.g. Roberts et al., 2001; Zeidner et al., 2005) . It is also the case that establishing that a test is correlated with intelligence tests is not logically equivalent to establishing that the test itself measures a form of intelligence, with additional validity evidence also being necessary (for example, for EI, evidence of associations with objective behavioural measures of emotional capability). Some specific concerns that have been raised in connection with the methods used to score ability EI tests, which tend to undermine rather than support the claim that EI is an intelligence, are discussed below.
Current research on ability EI is dominated by the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test (MSCEIT, Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2002) , with results also available for its predecessor the MEIS (Mayer et al, 1999) . These tests are both based on a theoretical model which divides EI into four branches: perceiving, using, understanding and managing emotions.
Whilst there a body of evidence supporting the criterion validity of the MSCEIT (see Mayer, Roberts, & Barsade, 2008 for a recent summary), there has been criticism of the use of consensus or expert scoring for this test (e.g. . The two forms of scoring are highly consistent, correlating in the range .93-.98 (Mayer et al., 2002) , but either method results in the maximum score on an item being obtained when the respondent chooses the option previously endorsed by the majority of either a standardisation sample or a group of experts. This scoring method does not correspond with that used in standard intelligence tests, where test items have well-defined correct answers. The structural validity of the MSCEIT has also been questioned, as several studies indicate a lack of fit with its theoretical factor structure (Keele & Bell, 2008; Palmer, Gignac, Manoca, & Stough, 2005; Rossen, Kranzler, & Algina, 2008) .
In addition to specific issues which have been raised by critics of the MSCEIT, an important contrast between the situation for ability EI measurement and that in other areas of individual differences research is the current lack of alternatives to this test.
Within the fields of both intelligence and personality researchers can select from a wide range of tests. This is also the case for trait EI, with a number of independentlydeveloped tests being available, for example the TEIQue (Petrides & Furnham, 2003) , the SSRI, (Schutte et al., 1998) and the EQ-i (Bar-On, 1997). This means that for trait EI, as for intelligence and personality, psychometric properties such as reliability and validity can be compared between tests, as can the performance of tests developed using different theoretical perspectives.
By contrast to the situation with trait EI, there is currently no alternative broadbandwidth ability EI measure (i.e. one which assesses all the EI components specified in the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso or any competing model) similar in scope to the MSCEIT. In a recent survey of the current status of EI research, Roberts, Zeidner, and Matthews (2007) creating and evaluating new items) can take place within the research community.
The content of the items of the STEU was derived from Roseman's (2001) appraisal-based emotion model, in which the emotion felt by a person is derived from features of their appraisal of the emotion-generating situation (for example relief is associated with the perception that an unpleasant situation has stopped or been averted). The test covers the emotions sadness, pride, relief, joy, regret, gratitude, distress, hope, contempt, surprise, frustration, anger, fear and dislike. It has 42 multiple-choice items which test respondents' knowledge of which emotion is most likely to be felt in a range of situations. The situations are described either in a decontextualised manner or in the context of a concrete example from work or personal life, with an equal number of decontextualised, personal and work items. situations involving arguments, being impeded in goal striving and unfairness), and using personal and work contexts were generated. Potential response options to these were then generated by a second group of 99 individuals; four of these responses were selected for each item and these were then assessed by experts to obtain scoring weights. The test comprises 44 multiple-choice items in which a scenario is presented (for example a close friend moving overseas permanently); the respondent has to choose among the four response options for the most effective action for the person experiencing that situation.
The present study
This paper extends the information available on the STEM and STEU by examining their associations with the MSCEIT and with performance on emotion perception tests. Emotion perception is a key criterion variable which needs to be examined when validating EI tests; individuals high in EI would be expected to display superior emotion perception abilities such as the identification of facial expressions of emotion. In addition to being considered a component of EI, emotion perception is regarded as underpinning higher-level capabilities such as understanding and managing emotions, since accurate perception of emotions is necessary for the exercise of these higher-level abilities (Mayer, Salovey, Caruso, & Sitarenios, 2001 ).
Thus scores on ability tests assessing all components of EI are expected to be positively associated with performance on emotion perception tasks. In the present study two tests of emotion perception were used, one of which was not time-limited, whilst the other was an inspection time (IT) task in which a limited amount of time was available to process an image of a face and identify its expression. This task has been used in previous work on associations between EI and emotion perception . Two intelligence tests, a vocabulary test and a test involving completing a number of letter series by deriving the logical rule underlying each of them were also included, and the divergent validity of the STEM and STEU with respect to trait EI was examined by also including two trait EI measures.
On the basis of the existing results for the STEM, STEU and MSCEIT, and the theoretical alignment of the STEM and STEU with the MSCEIT Managing and Understanding Emotions branches, the following hypotheses were formulated:
H1. STEM and STEU scores will be positively and significantly correlated with MSCEIT branch and total scores. Because ability EI components are expected (like intelligence battery sub-tests) to form a general factor, significant correlations with all MSCEIT branches would be expected, but the STEM would be expected to correlate most strongly with the MSCEIT Managing Emotions branch and the STEU most strongly with the MSCEIT Understanding Emotions branch.
H2. STEM, STEU and MSCEIT scores will be positively correlated with scores on emotion perception tasks. This follows from the above discussion of emotion perception ability as a criterion variable in validating EI tests.
H3. STEM, STEU and MSCEIT scores will be positively correlated with intelligence test scores. In the light of previous findings reviewed above, stronger correlations with vocabulary test performance (a crystallised ability measure) than with series completion would be expected.
H4. The STEM and STEU will display divergent validity with respect to trait EI,
showing weak or zero associations with trait EI scores. This expectation follows from findings, summarised above, showing that trait and ability EI are distinct constructs.
Method

Participants
The participants were 339 undergraduate students (238 females, 101 males) attending a UK university. The mean age of the group was 21.96 years, standard deviation 4.22 years.
Materials
In addition to the STEM and STEU, which are described in the introduction, the following measures were included:
Cognitive ability. Two tests from the Gf/Gc Quickie Test Battery (Stankov, 1997) were used. This battery is appropriate for and has been previously used with university student groups (e.g. MacCann et al., 2004 The consensus scoring option and standardised scores were used.
Face Blends. This computer task required participants to identify the emotion expressed by a face which was made up of a blend of two pictures of the same person expressing two different emotions. Stimuli were a blend of two of the three emotions of sadness, anger and fear with the proportion of a particular emotion in the blend (e.g. anger) being 10%, 20%, 30%, 40%,60%, 70%, 80% or 90%, together with unblended faces showing each of the three emotions. The blends were derived from one female and one male exemplar from the Ekman pictures of facial affect (Ekman & Friesen, 1976) and were obtained from the stimulus set supplied with the Facial Expressions of Emotion -Stimuli and Tests (FEEST; Young, Perrett, Calder, Sprengelmeyer, & Ekman, 2002) . All eight blends were used for each of the three emotion pairs for each exemplar, giving a total of 48 blended emotion items, which combined with the three unblended emotion pictures for each exemplar gave a total of 54 items. The correct answer for each stimulus was the majority emotion. The image size on the screen was 9 cm x 14 cm. At the start of the task participants were told that each face would "mostly" express anger, fear or sadness and were instructed to respond as quickly as possible without sacrificing accuracy. The presentation of each face was preceded by a fixation cross (+) in the middle of the screen displayed for 500 ms; the face was then displayed until the participant responded by pressing 7 (anger), 8 (fear) or 9 (sadness) on the numeric keypad. Stimuli were presented in a random order subject to the stipulation that the same emotion type would be repeated no more than three times in a row; the ordering was the same for all participants. Each response was followed by a blank screen for 500 ms and then the fixation cross for the next trial. The series of 54 experimental trials was preceded by six practice trials in which one male and one female exemplar of the three pure emotions (using pictures of different individuals from those used in the experimental trials) was used, with participants being given feedback on their performance; no feedback was given in the subsequent experimental trials. (Austin, 2004 (Austin, , 2005 . This task involved stimuli (two male and two female examples with sad and neutral expressions, giving a total of eight stimuli) taken from the Ekman and Friesen (1976) stimulus set. The same mask, a neutral female face (different from any of the stimuli), was used in all trials. Stimuli were presented on a computer screen; the on-screen size for the stimuli and mask was 55 x 85 mm. After the appearance of the mask, which was displayed for 500 ms, participants were instructed to press a key to indicate whether they thought that the stimulus face was sad or neutral. The task began with a practice session with each stimulus being presented twice, once at a duration of 500 ms and once at a duration of 800 ms; stimulus type /duration combinations were presented in a random order. Participants were able to repeat the practice session as many times as they wished. The data collection phase involved each stimulus being presented once at each of the following durations: 25, 32, 44, 57, 63, 75, 88, 100, 150, 250, 350, 400 ms, with stimulus type/duration combinations again presented in a random order.
Sad faces inspection time (IT) task
Thus each participant performed eight trials at each duration and 96 trials in total.
The score for this task was the total number of stimuli identified correctly. 
Results
Examination of the test scores showed that there were no significant differences in these between the groups, so data for the two groups were combined for the analyses respectively. Plots of the scores for the Vocabulary and Series tests indicated that these were normally distributed with no ceiling effects, confirming that these tests were of reasonable difficulty for students. Examination of sex differences showed that, after correction for multiple comparisons, the only significant differences were for the STEM and the trait EI SSRI scale, with females scoring higher on both of these (t (237) = 4.53, Cohen's d = .59, p < .001; t (201) = 2.77, d = .39, p = .006). seen that the differences between the full and partial correlations were generally small, suggesting that the associations amongst these tests are not accounted for by intelligence. None of these differences was significant. were not associated with improved performance when very rapid processing of the stimulus was required and participants were performing at or near chance levels (proportion correct .53-.67), but high scorers were advantaged as the stimulus duration increased beyond 53ms.
Associations of ability EI tests with emotion perception tasks
Associations of ability EI tests with intelligence test scores
The associations of the STEM, STEU and MSCEIT with Vocabulary and Series test scores are also shown in Table 3 . Both Vocabulary and Series showed significant positive correlations with MSCEIT Understanding, and Vocabulary also with the STEU; Series was negatively correlated with MSCEIT Perceiving.
Tables 2 and 3 near here
Associations of the STEM and STEU with trait EI
The correlations of the STEU with the TEIQue and SSRI were .03 (N = 144), -.04 (N= 195) ; the corresponding correlations for the STEM were .12 (N =53), .13 (N =103). None of these correlations were significant.
Reliability issues -additional analyses
A concern with the above findings is the low internal reliability of the STEU.
Comparing the internal reliabilities of the STEM, STEU and MSCEIT branches, the internal reliability of the STEM (although lower than desirable) falls within the range of values for the MSCEIT branches, whilst the STEU is outside this range. Given that the internal reliabilities of the STEU and to a lesser degree the STEM were found to be low by standard psychometric criteria, item analysis was used to identify a subset of more highly intercorrelated items within each test, with the item whose removal would raise the internal reliability of the test the most being removed at each iteration until no further reliability gain could be obtained. This procedure resulted in the retention of 29 STEM and 30 STEU items 2 . The internal reliability of the shortened STEM was .73, which is within the psychometrically acceptable range. The internal reliability of the shortened STEU was .58, which is more comparable to the values for some of the MSCEIT branches, but still undesirably low. Examination of the correlations of the shortened and more reliable versions of the STEM and STEU with the MSCEIT and emotion perception tasks showed that the correlation pattern was similar to that found with the full-length scales and with no significant differences between correlations calculated using the short and full-length tests. intelligence test scores were partialled out. This indicates that the overlap amongst these tests is not accounted for by intelligence, and in particular by the verbal skills required to comprehend and successfully complete these mostly highly verbal tests (Wilhelm, 2005) .
The expected associations with emotion perception tasks (H2) were found for the STEU and MSCEIT Understanding but not for the STEM and the other MSCEIT branches. In terms of criterion validity, this indicates that the tests of emotional understanding show the appropriate properties. The trend in STEU correlation as a function of the stimulus duration for the IT task showed that high scorers were only advantaged at intermediate and long stimulus durations, but did not show any performance advantage for very brief stimulus durations, suggesting that performance was enhanced for conscious rather than pre-conscious processing of emotional stimuli. Interestingly, the MSCEIT Perceiving branch was found not to correlate with emotion perception task performance; this result, and similar findings in other studies Roberts et al., 2006) The issue of why only the tests of emotional understanding were positively correlated with intelligence is an interesting one. Within the framework of their hierarchical model of EI Mayer et al. (2001, p235) argue that understanding emotions is the "most cognitively saturated" of the four EI branches, with the strongest association to abstract reasoning and emotional information-processing; the current findings are consistent with this viewpoint.
The distinctiveness of the STEM and STEU from trait EI (H4) was confirmed, in line with previous findings on associations between trait and ability EI tests (Bastian et al., 2005) , with neither test being significantly correlated with the trait EI measures.
A more general issue is whether ability EI represents a new form of intelligence.
The current results are in line with previous findings Roberts et al., 2001; Zeidner et al., 2005) A feature of the current generation of ability EI measures (which may be an indicator of a more fundamental issue underlying the reliability problems discussed above) is the focus on tests which assess EI components such as understanding or managing emotions across a range of emotions; this is the case for the MSCEIT, STEM and STEU. This design feature assumes that there is no significant intraindividual variability in the processing of specific emotions. It however seems likely that, for example, some people may be good at understanding and managing joy and elation but less capable with regard to sadness and distress, or vice versa. For multi-emotion EI tests, the existence of a variety of such profiles would mean that the test was not unidimensional and would reduce item-item correlations and hence test reliability. Given the central status of at least partially separable positive emotion/reward sensitivity and negative emotion/punishment sensitivity systems in current personality models (e.g. Gomez & Cooper, 2008) , and the evidence for the existence of distinct neural systems underlying different emotions (Panksepp, 1998) In considering the development of a wider range of ability EI measures, another possible direction which should be explored is that of tests which assess rapid (not necessarily conscious) processing of emotional information, as in the emotional IT task used in the present study, and in tests of social perception which require processing of subtle non-verbal cues. This approach contrasts with that adopted in current ability EI tests (reflecting the dominant ability EI model) which rely on the respondent making use of explicit conscious knowledge of emotions in response to test items. The development of models of EI which relate to implicit as well as explicit emotional knowledge, and of test formats which are appropriate to measure the latter is desirable. Related to this is a need for tests which assess the speed or efficiency with which novel emotional information is processed. These attributes are likely to be more closely related to a fluid component of EI than to the crystallised emotion knowledge which is the focus of current EI research.
Another key issue in ability EI measurement is the question of how ability EI should be modelled. The STEM, STEU and MSCEIT are all based on the MayerSalovey-Caruso four-branch model of EI, which currently dominates research and debate on ability EI. This leaves open the question of whether this model is the best or most complete one for ability EI. Examination of its structure indicates that some aspects of EI are not being fully assessed by the MSCEIT. Examples are lower-level facets currently not assessed separately within the four-branch model such as empathy, stress management and emotional expressivity. In addition, when formulating hypotheses about the associations of EI with real-world outcomes, a separation into the superoordinate dimensions of inter-and intrapersonal EI is often theoretically useful, corresponding to two distinct ways in which emotional abilities can be deployed. Thus expanding the current model used both upwards to these two broad domains, and downwards to more specific facets of EI is clearly desirable.
Notes 1 Mixed models of EI, not specifically considered here, include both ability and personality components. In the present work the definitions of trait and ability EI are aligned to the method of measurement used in their operationalization (Petrides & Furnham, 2003) , so self-report measures associated with an underlying mixed model are considered to be trait EI measures.
2 The items were: STEM 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 16, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28, 29, 31, 32, 34, 35, 36, 37, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44; STEU 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29, 31, 32, 33, 38, 39, 40, 41.42 3 Tables 2 and 3 present correlations relating to the study hypotheses. The full correlation matrix amongst all study variables is available from the author. Mean error rates for the emotion perception tasks were Blends 9.6%, Sad IT 23.4%. 
